Smallpox Models as Policy Tools1 by McKenzie, F. Ellis
Mathematical models can help prepare for and
respond to bioterrorism attacks, provided that their
strengths and weaknesses are clearly understood. A series
of initiatives within the Department of Health and Human
Services brought modelers together with biologists and epi-
demiologists who specialize in smallpox and experts in
bioterrorism response and health policy and has led to the
parallel development of models with different technical
approaches but standardized scenarios, parameter ranges,
and outcome measures. Cross-disciplinary interactions
throughout the process supported the development of mod-
els focused on systematically comparing alternate interven-
tion strategies, determining the most important issues in
decision-making, and identifying gaps in current knowl-
edge. 
T
he man who demonstrated that malaria is transmitted
by mosquitoes, Sir Ronald Ross, developed the first
mathematical model of malaria transmission in 1911. In
presenting his model, Ross made the crucial point that “the
mathematical method of treatment is really nothing but the
application of careful reasoning to the problems at issue”
(1). In short, mathematical modeling is no more and no
less than a tool to support clear thinking. 
In the United States, mathematical models are familiar,
everyday tools in engineering, business, and military
applications and in most sciences. They represent hypothe-
ses about underlying mechanisms that generate observed
phenomena or the options for action and potential conse-
quences. However, those models are rare in the biomed-
ical-research and public health communities.
The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized that the
United States should use every tool available to help pre-
pare for, and respond to, bioterrorism. With that under-
standing in mind, a series of National Institutes of Health
(NIH) consultations was organized to address the potential
of mathematical models to help with bioterrorism pre-
paredness and response.
The first of those, in December 2001, brought together
a small group of modelers and a small group of health-pol-
icy experts. The basic idea of this meeting was to see if a
productive dialogue would emerge, and one did, despite
the language and culture barriers. This dialogue led to a
much better understanding of what modeling could and
could not do to help.
The overall conclusion of the meeting was that models
can be of great value, provided that their strengths and
weaknesses are clearly understood. Modelers and nonmod-
elers should develop realistic expectations. For instance,
models will not provide accurate numerical predictions of
outcomes in this context; models can be used to forecast
only in fairly gross terms. The key is to look not for
absolute numbers but for differences in outcomes between
different strategies and between different models. The con-
sensus from that first consultation was that models can
provide a means to systematically compare alternative
intervention strategies, determine the most important
issues in decision-making, and identify critical gaps in cur-
rent knowledge. 
Those three points are not as simple and straightfor-
ward as they may seem. For instance, if modeling is going
to help identify and focus on the decisions likely to have
the largest effects on outcomes, the models must address
actual decisions to be made in actual bioterrorism events.
That first consultation highlighted the need for active
engagement and creative tension between modelers and
policy experts. Modelers may focus on areas that interest
them but seem tangential to decision-makers. On the other
hand, if only policy experts are engaged, they may concen-
trate on information that fits their opinions and interests.
The modeling most likely to help with bioterrorism pre-
paredness and response will emerge from scientific, oper-
ational, and policy professionals who listen to and engage
each other, with real respect and candor, on a continuing
basis.
A corollary conclusion from that first consultation was
that modeling can provide a comprehensive, explicit
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USA.examination of the assumptions and logic that enter into a
decision, in a way that purely verbal reasoning and debate
cannot. In that sense, even if the results of a model were
discarded, the modeling process alone, properly conduct-
ed, would more than return the investment.
Another way of looking at this same set of issues is the
observation that many people, modelers and nonmodelers
alike, seem to believe that one “right” model exists. In this
context, at least, that is not likely to be the case. However,
a great deal can be learned from examining circumstances
in which several models disagree, whether or not they
agree on some overall, qualitative result.
For example, the Figure shows output from two hypo-
thetical models. The horizontal axis gives the fraction of a
population covered by some intervention, e.g., a vaccine,
and the vertical axis shows the resulting percentage reduc-
tion in death rate. At 0% coverage, the number of deaths
does not change. Approaching 100% coverage, deaths are
reduced nearly 100%. Both models agree that fewer deaths
occur when more people are covered, but obvious differ-
ences also exist between the model results. According to
model A, slightly less than 30% coverage would reduce
deaths by half; according to model B, almost 70% cover-
age is needed to reduce deaths by the same amount.
Because these sorts of models embody hypotheses
about underlying mechanisms, the differences may have to
do with varying ideas about how a particular vaccine
works in particular subpopulations, at particular sites, with
different methods of introduction, or whether the vaccine
acts synergistically with some other intervention. Many
possibilities and uncertainties exist, but each of those ideas
is in the models, explicitly. One should be able to clearly
see what the different assumptions are, why the modelers
put them there, and what data support them.
The results to rely on, of course, are those on which a
number of different models agree in general terms, not pre-
cise, detailed predictions. But if models disagree, if one
assumes that they were created by competent, honest mod-
elers, the information that must be used to make the deci-
sion comes under more scrutiny. What are the assump-
tions? What are the most critical gaps in the data? Why is
there disagreement? Reasonable differences in assump-
tions that give rise to a critical difference in outcomes
point to high priorities for research.
One of the recommendations from the first consultation
was that a “proof of principle” project be undertaken for a
specific set of issues. That recommendation was the basis
of the second consultation, in April 2002, which focused
specifically on smallpox modeling. The basic idea was to
get a group of smallpox modelers in the same room to talk
with smallpox biology and epidemiology experts and with
bioterrorism-response and health-policy experts. Anumber
of questions arose, but three stand out as examples of ways
in which modeling can help to clarify assumptions.
The first of those questions was, “When does a person
infected with smallpox become infectious? Is he or she still
mobile, or already severely ill?” Joel Breman and D.A.
Henderson had just published a review article (2), which
stated, “Patients are most infectious from the onset of the
enanthema through the first 7 to 10 days of rash.” That is,
the period of peak infectivity starts 1 day before the rash
appears. Modelers interpreted that statement, and others in
the literature, in a variety of ways, with slight differences
in some cases and major differences in others. Differences
in interpretation contributed to some of the more striking
differences in model outcomes, which flagged the question
as a critical one. 
What is known about the infectivity of smallpox should
be understood and represented in the most precise, accu-
rate, and useful way possible. Modeling forces specific
questions that help that process. If infected persons are less
infectious before the onset of enanthema, how long before
and how much less? Do onset and intensity of infectivity
vary? By how much? How can infectivity or exposure be
interpreted in terms of duration and distance of contact?
The process of modeling forces an examination of the sen-
sitivity of the results to specific answers.
The second question was, “What, in concrete, opera-
tional terms, is meant by ‘ring’vaccination?” Some partic-
ipants based their understanding primarily on their own
experience, some on reports in the literature, and some on
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
interim response policy of that time. Discussions of how
the models had translated this first-line response strategy,
now usually known as “surveillance and containment,”
highlighted several discrepancies and ambiguities. Similar
questions arose about the meanings of “isolation” and
“quarantine.”
Constructing mathematical models helps make premis-
es explicit and quantifiable, to explain what is intended by
concepts such as infectivity or ring vaccination. Models
are tools, but mathematical models, more than purely ver-
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Figure. Output from two hypothetical models.bal models, facilitate comprehensiveness and precision in
describing assumptions and their implications.
The third question was, “How can models best repre-
sent the process by which an infectious agent may be trans-
mitted?” The classic method of modeling considers a pop-
ulation to be divided into distinct subpopulations: suscep-
tible, infected, infectious, and removed (i.e., dead or recov-
ered and immune). Members of the population mix freely
with each other, and disease spreads through contact
between persons in the susceptible and infectious compart-
ments. These models typically take the form of differential
equations.
Computers have made possible a different approach to
infectious disease modeling that allows modeling of inter-
actions between distinct persons, some of whom may have
many contacts during a given time period, while others
have only a few. Again, differences in outcomes can arise
from differences in assumptions, in this case, assumptions
about social structures and mixing processes. And again,
hazards of oversimplicity and overcomplexity can be
remarkably subtle. For critical applications, the sensible
move is to examine the sensitivity of results to specific
methods by comparing different intervention strategies not
only within each modeling framework but across different
modeling frameworks.
Following the second consultation, the Secretary’s
Advisory Council on Public Health Preparedness, in the
Department of Health and Human Services, formed a
working group on smallpox modeling with a similar mix of
people. The group was charged with developing models of
smallpox spread and the potential effects of several types
of interventions, in several attack scenarios, to help ana-
lyze a range of options. Specific tasks were for the work-
ing group as a whole to standardize scenarios, parameter
ranges, and outcome measures. Then, modelers with dif-
ferent approaches (deterministic differential-equation, sto-
chastic simulation, and individual-based simulation) were
charged with developing draft models to be reviewed by
the entire group, revised by the modelers, reviewed again,
revised again, and so forth.
Each group of modelers is now nearly ready to submit
a paper describing its model and results for peer review
and publication; these articles will be accompanied by a
detailed description of the common scenarios, assump-
tions, and parameter ranges. The aim here is to briefly out-
line the process the entire group went through and some of
the factors considered in the models. This process has been
unique in U.S. public health experience. 
Achieving consensus on the scenarios and outcome
measures was not difficult, at least not in comparison to the
challenge of reviewing data and expert judgments and
agreeing on parameter ranges and other assumptions. For
all biology-epidemiology parameters, for example, ranges
were expected to reflect what is known about the natural
spread of smallpox, but existing information comes from
efforts to treat, impede, and ultimately eradicate smallpox;
the data were not collected to guide modelers, researchers,
and policymakers. Thus, like most models, the models
developed by the working group encompass a mixture of
facts and hypotheses about mechanisms driving the
dynamics at almost every level. As a result, as with most
models, sensitivity analyses, which show the extent to
which changes in parameters change results, make the
caveats explicit and precise and also show which
unknowns are most important to outcomes and most criti-
cal for research.
For example, the working group had to decide on prob-
ability distributions for the timing and intensity of key
events such as incubation period, onset of fever and rash,
onset and degrees of infectivity, and the like. While these
discussions were often framed in biologic and clinical
terms, in operational terms, the objective was to assess
probabilities of case recognition, and in epidemiologic
terms, the objective was to determine probabilities of
transmission with various sorts of contact, to define “con-
tact,” and when possible, to calibrate everything to agreed-
upon data in an agreed-upon way.
The group learned to appreciate three major disease sub-
types. Since ordinary, hemorrhagic, and modified-spectrum
smallpox cases differ with respect to manifestation, death
rate, and transmission rate, the distribution of these sub-
types in a population could affect disease spread.
Accordingly, the group had to pursue related issues, such as
the likely prevalence and strength of immunity in people
who had been vaccinated long ago. The group also had to
agree on probabilities that at any given point a person with
smallpox would go to work or school, go to the hospital, or
stay home. The question of who continues to circulate is
influenced by manifestation and many other factors, and
circulation affects not only who is likely to become infect-
ed but also who becomes a contact to be traced.
The group developed scenarios for attacks of three dif-
ferent sizes in terms of the number initially infected and
size of the community, the site of origin, and characteris-
tics of first cases. Age and household characteristics in the
model populations reflect 2000 census data, with commu-
nities structured to incorporate homes, neighborhoods,
schools, workplaces, and hospitals. Hospital characteris-
tics reflect available U.S. data in terms of service area and
population, number of beds, staff with patient contact, and
so forth. The group made assumptions about the behavior
of healthcare workers, isolation of patients, effectiveness
of preexposure vaccine, vaccine efficacy when given at
particular points postexposure, and the like.
With respect to overall intervention strategies, the
group considered surveillance and containment in quanti-
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such as reliability of case ascertainment and efficiency of
contact tracing, at various points for various types of con-
tacts. Other possibilities included case isolation; preemp-
tively vaccinating healthcare workers, at various levels of
coverage; mass reactive vaccination, at several levels and
speeds of coverage; school closings; and other measures,
singly or in combination, taking into account that recog-
nizing and confirming the first cases would be slower than
with subsequent cases. Decisions such as when to expand
a ring vaccination strategy to a wider community would
not depend solely on epidemiologic or operational factors,
but political or other factors were specifically not consid-
ered in the models. 
Repeated discussions took place about the details of
interventions, smallpox biology, social structures, and
other factors. Typically, after a set of assumptions seemed
to be in place and modelers had worked with them, related
questions would emerge to be discussed, studied, and tried
out. Arecurring theme was the great difficulty of recogniz-
ing, untangling, and reconciling cryptic assumptions.
This sample of factors gives a good idea of the scale
and scope of the working group’s efforts, enough to sup-
port the claim that even if the results of the models were
discarded, the process alone would justify the investment.
What seem to be fairly close to final results are now
emerging for the first two scenarios, and the three models
seem to agree in qualitative terms with respect to interven-
tion strategies: essentially, a prompt, thorough surveillance
and containment response should be effective. Even that
preliminary agreement comes with caveats, however, and
exists in general terms, not necessarily in detailed predic-
tions. 
The published models should include a great deal of
information, enough to allow replication with virtually any
desired change in premises, parameter ranges, and scenar-
ios. One aim of publication is to describe the structure,
data, assumptions, hypotheses, and logic involved in a
clear and comprehensive manner, so that each aspect can
be tested, and alternate choices evaluated, by others with
experience in the field. This transparency helps guard
against the “garbage in, gospel out” phenomenon that
plagues some modeling, policymaking, and laboratory and
field studies. Peer review is beneficial, but no good substi-
tute exists for active, ongoing involvement of multiple
modelers and other experts in the process, even for less
critical applications.
Participants in the December 2001 consultation recom-
mended that “analytic modeling become an explicit ele-
ment in strategic plans for biodefense preparation and
response.” If that is to happen, the United States needs to
develop and sustain appropriate modeling expertise and
access. The Working Group on Smallpox Modeling marks
a small but important step in that direction. Modeling
seems most likely to be of help in strategic planning and
preparation (3), but the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in
the United Kingdom in 2001 suggests that real-time mod-
eling could also be useful in an infectious disease emer-
gency (4).
Fourier is said to have remarked, 200 years ago, that
“nature is extremely indifferent towards the difficulties
imposed on mathematicians” (5). But enormous sums are
invested in modeling weather and economies, although the
models are often wrong, and too many variables are
involved to consistently obtain accurate predictions. Those
investments are made because stakes are high: verbal
analysis alone cannot provide solutions, and “perfect”
models will never appear by magic. The same principle
holds true with developing models as policy tools.
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